Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is associated with threat-related attention and interpretation biases. Recent research suggests that attention control abilities moderate these associations. The current study examines threat-related attentional engagement and disengagement biases, negative interpretation bias, and attention control among youth with SAD (n=71) and non-anxious youth (n=42). We further explore interactions between cognitive biases, and between these biases and attention control, in predicting SAD. Relative to non-anxious youth, youth with SAD had poorer attention control, p=.001, greater difficulty disengaging from angry faces, p=.05, and a negative biased interpretation of ambiguous social scenarios, p =.01. However, no interactions were found among these factors in relation to SAD diagnosis or symptoms. The present results add to research on cognitive biases in anxious children, emphasizing a distinct contribution of each of these cognitive mechanisms, rather than their interactional influences. Findings are discussed in relation to cognitive developmental models of anxiety.
Introduction
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is one of the most prevalent of all psychiatric disorders in youth. SAD is characterized by excessive self-consciousness and overwhelming anxiety in social situations. It significantly impairs social and academic functioning in youth, which can have significant long-term impact on children's adjustment (Beidel, Turner, & Morris, 1999; Morgan, 2010; Ollendick & Hirshfeld-Becker, 2002; Stein & Kean, 2000) . Prior research suggests that SAD involves a range of cognitive biases. The current report examines the way in which various cognitive biases manifest and interact in youth with SAD relative to non-anxious youth.
Cognitive models of SAD implicate diverse information-processing biases in the development and maintenance of the disorder (e.g., Clark & McManus, 2002; McManus et al., 2009; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) . Specifically, socially anxious individuals are thought to selectively direct cognitive resources to threats and hold unique processing patterns that determine how threat-related information is attended (e.g., Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; Vasilopoulos, 2005) and interpreted (e.g., Amir, Beard, & Bower, 2005; Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa, & Mathews, 2007; Kanai, Sasagawa, Chen, Shimada, & Sakano, 2010) . Of note, such models typically assume that these different types of cognitive bias contribute to the etiology and maintenance of social anxiety in an interactive manner (Spokas, Rodebaugh, & Heimberg, 2007) . However, most empirical research examines the unique contribution of each bias type separately, and mostly in adults. Here we explore associations among biased attention to social threats, biased interpretation of ambiguous social situations, and general attention control (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Lonigan, Vasey, Phillips, & Hazen, 2004) in youth with SAD. We also explore possible interactions between these factors in their potential contribution to SAD among youth. Below we briefly review the evidence for cognitive biases in SAD.
Socially anxious adults exhibit threat-related attention bias (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Mogg et al., 2004) . Cognitive models of anxiety typically assume that this bias reflect an attentional system that is distinctively sensitive to threat-related stimuli in the environment, and that further top-down evaluation processes contribute to the salience of threat processing (for a review see Cisler & Koster, 2010) . Specific models of social anxiety also emphasize the role of attention allocation to threat cues as a key factor in the maintenance of social anxiety (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) . However, the precise nature of these biases in SAD remains unclear, with different studies reporting facilitated attention to threat, difficulty in disengagement from threat, or both (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009 ). Yet other findings in SAD suggest a threat-related attentional pattern of initial vigilance followed by later avoidance (e.g., Kircanski, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2015) . That said, many findings in SAD appear to point to salience of difficulty to disengage attention from threat, rather than facilitated attention towards threat (e.g., Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & Przeworski, 2003; Buckner, Maner, & Schmidt, 2010; Heeren, Lievens, & Philippot, 2011; Moriya & Tanno, 2011) . The inability to effectively disengage from threat is thought to contribute to maladaptive rumination and to the creation of a vicious cycle, in which anxiety is increased as the dwelling on the social threat continues (Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Heeren et al., 2011) .
The specific manifestation of attentional threat bias in youth with SAD is still unknown. Threat-related attention biases have been demonstrated among temperamentally anxious youth, including in children as young as 5-7 years of age (e.g., Pérez-Edgar et al., 2011; White et al., in press ). Most studies on attention bias in pediatric anxiety disorders include youth with various comorbid anxieties (e.g., Eldar et al., 2012; Roy et al., 2008; Shechner et al., 2014) , generating variability in evidence (Carmona et al., 2015; Puliafico & Kendall, 2006; Roy, Dennis, & Warner, 2015; Waters, Mogg, Bradley, & Pine, 2011) . Furthermore, only few studies consider relative contributions of specific attention sub-components, such as attention engagement and disengagement with threat, in pediatric SAD. The present study assesses threat-related attention bias using an emotion spatial cueing task (Posner, 1980; Yiend & Mathews, 2001 ) that affords separate evaluation of the engage and disengage components of threat-related spatial attention.
Evidence for negative interpretation bias in socially anxious youth is more consistent, revealing a tendency to negatively interpret social stimuli or situations (e.g, Amin, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Miers, Blöte, Bögels, & Westenberg, 2008; Muris, Merckelbach, & Damsma, 2000; Stopa & Clark, 2000) . In contrast, the nature of the relations between interpretation and attention biases in predicting social anxiety is rarely studied, and remains unclear. One of the few indications for reciprocal influences between these different bias types comes from studies that used attention or interpretation bias modification. These studies find that changes in one bias follow from training of the other bias (Amir, Bomyea, & Beard, 2010; White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 2011) .
Interactions between attention and interpretation biases could unfold in a variety of ways. For example, a common cognitive mechanism, such as priming by threatening perceptual representations, could influence both attention and interpretation biases in parallel, or alternatively, each bias could reflect independent aspects of threat-related information processing, with independent effects on anxiety (Teachman, Smith-Janik, & Saporito, 2007) . These possibilities may be revealed in independent contributions of each bias type to the explained variability in SAD, but not necessarily a significant contribution of the interaction between them. Alternatively, cyclical or bi-directional influences of attention and interpretation biases could jointly contribute to and maintain social anxiety. For instance, some authors suggest that attention serves as a "gateway" to later cognitive biases, such as interpretation. These biases, in turn, may affect further allocation of attention forming a cyclic influence (Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006; Neisser, 1967; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2011; White et al., 2011) . If cyclic processes do exist, one could speculate that attention and interpretation biases could interact to produce elevated anxiety levels. Prominent cognitive models of social anxiety refer specifically to how attentional processes maintain fears through such a vicious cycle in which attention is drawn to the negative aspects in a situation and confirm the negative beliefs an anxious person has about the situation or about the self (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Spurr & Stopa, 2003) .
Beyond these emotion-related biases, it has been suggested that general attention control may influence cognitive biases in anxiety. Attention control refers to individual differences in the ability to effortfully monitor attentional allocation and to inhibit an automatic response in order to perform a subdominant response (Helzer, Connor-Smith, & Reed, 2009; Rothbart, Ellis, & Posner, 2004; Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2004) . Attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) generally assumes that anxiety impairs attentional control (i.e., inhibition and/or shifting functions). The inhibition function prevents task-irrelevant stimuli and responses from disrupting performance, while the shifting function is used to allocate attention in a flexible and optimal way to stimuli that are currently most relevant (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011) . Thus, Individual differences in attention control may influence the ability to amend negative affect through regulation of automatic and controlled functions that occur during threat processing. For example, inhibiting the processing of task-irrelevant, threatening information, and focusing on alternative aspects in the environment, may enables to override initial biased reactions, with the potential of reducing anxiety through such attention regulation (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Eysenck et al., 2007; Henderson, Pine, & Fox, 2014) . This process is thought to be reflected in the neurological interplay between heightened responses in the amygdala and related structures that are involved in automatic threat detection, and recruitment of top-down regulatory processes in the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2007; Monk et al., 2008) .
Resent research supports the notion that both the inhibition and the shifting functions of attention control may modulate the relations between risk factors and adjustment problems (e.g., Lengua, 2002) . Interactions between fearful affectivity, attention control, and threat-related attention bias were reported in community samples (e.g., Helzer et al., 2009; Lonigan & Vasey, 2009) , and patterns of relations between attention control and attention biases differentiated clinically anxious relative to non-anxious youth (Vervoort et al., 2011) . A study with socially anxious adults specifically exemplified the moderating role of attention control (focusing and shifting) on the relation between threat-related attention bias and social anxiety: for participants with low attention control anxiety was associated with slower attentional disengagement from threat while the opposite was true for participants with high attention control (Taylor, Cross, & Amir, 2016) . To our knowledge, no prior study examined the relations between attention control, interpretation bias, and SAD. However, some supportive findings for relations between attention focusing and shifting components and negative interpretative bias do emerge from studies with community samples (Muris, Meesters, & Rompelberg, 2007) , or from studies using experimental designs (Bowler et al., 2012) . The extant findings suggest that youth who show low levels of attention control may be more prone to display threat-related attention and interpretation biases. However, much less is known about these relations in clinical populations. The study of these cognitive processes in children and adolescents, could inform about factors contributing to the etiology and maintenance of SAD in youth. Based on the extant evidence, it could be speculated that attention control would interact with both attention and interpretation biases in predicting social anxiety. If the assumption that better attention control diminishes the impact of threat biases on anxiety is correct, then it may be expected that for participants with poor attention control the relations between cognitive biases and anxiety will be stronger.
To sum, the current study explores associations among attention bias, interpretation bias, and general attention control in pediatric SAD. Based on previous findings, we expected: a) youth with SAD to show a more negative interpretation bias and greater threat-related attention bias relative to their non-anxious peers; b) attention control abilities to interact with attention and interpretation biases in predicting SAD diagnosis. If such interactions emerge, we expect that lower attention control combined with high threat-related attention or interpretation biases would be more related to SAD; finally, c) we explored for possible interaction between attention and interpretation biases in predicting social anxiety. It was expected that joint elevated levels of threat-related attention and interpretation biases will be related to enhanced levels of social anxiety.
Method Participants
Participants were 113 children and adolescents. The SAD group consisted of 71 youth (Mage = 12.5 years, SD = 3.14, Range = 6-18 years, 40.5% boys) with a primary diagnosis of SAD (primacy determined as SAD being the main complaint and primary source of behavioral and emotional dysfunction). Diagnosis was ascertained using the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS, Albano & Silverman, 1996) , a semi-structured interview assessing anxiety, mood, and externalizing disorders in children. Clinical psychologists trained to 85% reliability criterion with a senior psychologist administered the interviews. Based on the information from independent child and parent interviews, diagnoses and severity ratings were scored by the clinician. Children were included in the SAD group if they filled all criteria for SAD with an ADIS severity rating of 4 or higher.
The non-anxious control group consisted of 42 children and adolescents (Mage = 12.22 years, SD = 3.12, Range = 7-18 years, 46.5% boys) without any anxiety disorder. Children were included in the non-anxious group if an ADIS interview indicated no clinical or subclinical anxiety and no psychological or pharmacological treatments were reported. The SAD and non-anxious groups did not differ in mean age, t(111) = -.39, p = .70, age variability, F = .34, p = .56, or gender ratio, χ²(1) = .39, p = .54.
Questionnaires
The Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SPAI). Youth self-reported social anxiety was assessed using the SPAI (Beidel, Turner, & Morris, 1995) , a 26-item questionnaire, designed to assesses a range of potentially anxietyproducing situations and probes, physical and cognitive characteristics of social anxiety, and avoidance behaviors.
Journal of Experimental Psychopathology, Volume 7 (2016), Issue 3, [484] [485] [486] [487] [488] [489] [490] [491] [492] [493] [494] [495] [496] [497] [498] The items are rated on a 3-point scale to indicate their occurrence and the SPAI final score is the sum of all ratings, with higher score representing higher levels of social anxiety. The SPAI has high internal consistency, high retest reliability, and adequate external validity (Beidel, Turner, & Fink, 1996; Beidel et al., 1995; Higa, Fernandez, Nakamura, Chorpita, & Daleiden, 2006) . Internal consistency in the present sample using Cronbach's α was .97.
Early Adolescent Temperament Questionnaire-Revised (EATQ-R).
Following Helzer et al. (2009) , we used parent reports on the EATQ-R to measure attention control. Attention control was based on two subscales of the EATQ-R: Attention and Inhibitory Control. The attention subscale (six items) measures the capacity to focus attention as well as to shift attention when desired, whereas the inhibitory control subscale (five items) measures the capacity to plan and suppress inappropriate responses. An attention control index was computed as a mean score of these two subscales, with higher scores representing better attention control. This aggregated index (previously used in Helzer et al., 2009 ) embodies attention shifting and inhibitory functions, both considered to have influence on anxiety according to attention control theory (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011) . The EATQ-R is considered a reliable tool for assessing temperament in children and adolescents, and was found to have acceptable convergent and construct validities Oldehinkel, Hartman, Ferdinand, Verhulst, & Ormel, 2007; Putnam, Ellis, & Rothbart, 2001) .
In the present sample the Attention and Inhibitory Control sub-scales significantly correlated, r = .59, p<.001, and the SAD and control groups differed significantly on both the Inhibitory Control and Attention scales, t(106) = 6.59, p<.001 and t(106) = 4.29, p<.001, respectively. Internal consistency of the combined attention control index using Cronbach's α was .78.
Threat-Related Attention Bias -Emotion Spatial-Cuing Task
Materials. The stimuli were 48 photographs of 16 individuals (8 male), taken from the NimStim Set of Facial Expressions (Tottenham et al., 2009 ). The faces portrayed one of three different emotional expressions of each actor: angry, happy, and neutral. Each face photograph subtended 70mm high by 45mm wide.
Procedure. The sequence of events in a trial is depicted in Figure 1 . Each trial began with two grey boxes presented for 1000 ms to the left and right of a white central fixation cross. A face cue then appeared in the left or in the right grey boxes for 200 ms, and 50 ms later a target (an arrow pointing either up or down) was presented until a response was made or until 6 seconds elapsed. Participants were instructed to press one of two buttons to indicate as quickly and as accurately as possible the target type. Each face cue and each target appeared equally often in the left and right locations. On 75% of the trials the cue face was valid (i.e., the target appeared in the same location as the cue face). On 25% of the trials, the cue face was invalid (i.e., the target appeared in the location opposite to the cue face). The faces appeared 144 times in validly cued locations and 48 times in invalidly cued locations (i.e., four repetitions of each face image). The task consisted of 12 practice trials, followed by two buffer trials and 192 experimental trials.
Bias indices. Threat-related modulation of performance on valid trials was taken to indicate that attention bias occurred at the stage of initial orienting of attention, whereas modulation on invalid cue trials was taken to reflect the stage of attention disengagement from threat-related material. Accordingly, two attention bias scores were calculated. The engagement score was based on the valid trials, and was taken as the average response time (RT) to targets appearing at angry face locations minus the average RT to targets appearing at neutral face locations. The disengagement score was based on the invalid trials, and was computed as mean neutral RT minus mean threat RT. Thus, a positive score in both indices reflected greater attention bias toward threat (either fast engagement or difficulty to disengage from threat), and a negative value indicated slower engagement or fast disengagement from threat, respectively.
Interpretation Bias
Materials. Negative interpretation bias was measured using ten items depicting ambiguous social scenarios that could be interpreted as either threatening or non-threatening. Eight items were derived from previous studies measuring interpretation bias in anxious youth (Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, & Ryan, 1996; Bogels & Zigterman, 2000) . Two additional items, similar to the existing items in terms of length and wording style, were generated by the authors.
Procedure. The ten scenarios were divided into two sets, counterbalanced within the groups, and each participant was presented with 5 scenarios. The presented questions and their scoring followed previously used procedures (Barrett et al., 1996 , Creswell, Schniering & Rapee, 2005 . After the presentation of each scenario the child was presented with: 1) an open-ended question ("What do you think is happening?"), designed to elicit spontaneous interpretation of the situation; 2) a forced-choice question in which children had to choose one of two possible interpretations presented to them (threatening or not-threatening); and 3) another open-ended question asking the child for his or her own expected behavior in the described situation ("What would you have done in this situation?"). Answers to the third question were categorized to three types of behavioral intentions -avoidant (i.e., any action that allowed escape from or avoidance of potentially harmful or embarrassing situations); pro-social (any action that is intended to lead to a constructive, pro-social solution); or aggressive (any action that was potentially harmful or embarrassing to others). Inter-rater reliability for the interpretation coding was Kappa = .87, p<.001.
Figure 1: The sequence of events in an invalid trial (left) and valid trial (right) of the emotional-spatial cueing task.
Bias indices. The number of threat responses (in the spontaneous and in the forced-choice questions) and the number of avoidant behavioral intentions were each summed across scenarios. Each sum score was divided by the overall relevant number of responses provided by the child to yield indices of interpretation bias (i.e., the bias index represent the number of threat-related responses relative to overall responses). These three indexes were significantly correlated with one another, rs ranged .28-.62, ps<.01, and thus were averaged into one aggregated interpretation bias score for which a higher score represented greater threat interpretation bias.
General Procedure
Participants were recruited through advertisement in newspapers and announcements in community settings. Following a short telephone screening with the parents, youth potentially eligible for participation and their parents were invited to the laboratory. Parents and children were interviewed using the ADIS and completed the questionnaires. Children also completed the attention and interpretation bias assessments. For all participants, parents provided written informed consent, and children provided written assent. The study was approved by the University's Institutional Review Board.
Data Analysis
Performance on the emotional-spatial cueing task was screened for outliers: a) incorrect responses were removed; b) means of RTs were computed for each participant for every trial type separately (valid and invalid, for angry and neutral faces), trials with RT +/-2.5 SD from the trial type mean were considered outliers and removed from analysis; and c) after computation of the bias indices, participants with bias scores (engagement or disengagement) +/-2.5 SD from the groups' mean were excluded from analysis.
T-tests were used to test for differences between the SAD and non-anxious groups on emotional and cognitive characteristics. To investigate the relative contribution of each cognitive variable, as well as their interactions, to the odds of clinical SAD diagnosis, a binary logistic regression analysis was carried out across participants, with group (SAD, non-anxious) as the dependent variable. In the first step of the regression, attention bias, threat interpretation bias, and attention control were entered into the regression. Two-way interaction terms (interpretation bias X attention bias, interpretation bias X attention control, attention bias X attention control) were entered in the second step to assess their possible conjoint influences.
As a secondary analysis, we applied a linear regression model to assess the contribution of the above described variables and their interactions, to the severity of self-reported social anxiety symptoms, with the SPAI score as the outcome.
Results

Groups Characteristics
Means, standard deviations, and significance for contrasts between the SAD and the non-anxious groups are presented in Table 1 . Correlations between study variables are presented in Table 2 . As expected due to the selection process the SAD group had significantly higher social anxiety scores as reported by the youth on the SPAI, t(111) = -6.06, p<.001. In addition, compared to the non-anxious group, the SAD group had lower attention control capabilities, t(106) = 6.32,p<.001, greater difficulty to disengage attention from angry faces, t(107) = 1.98, p = .05, and a more negative interpretation bias, t(111) = -2.38,p = .01. The groups did not differ in attention engagement with angry faces, t(107) = .27, p = .78. Inter-correlations between cognitive measures were all non-significant, rs ranged .00-.13, ps>.30. In addition, to test for age and gender-related differences on children's cognitive measures, correlation and t-test were conducted, respectively. All analyses revealed non-significance, rs ranged -.06-.13, ps>0.15 and t values ranged .49-1.43, ps>.15. 
Primary Analysis -Clinician Reported Diagnostic Status
The multivariate logistic regression model significantly accounted for 46.1% of the variance in SAD diagnosis, χ 2 (6) = 43.47, p<.001. Overall, the variables entered in the first step (main effects), significantly accounted for 45.3% of the variance, χ 2 (3) = 42.52, p<.001, whereas the interaction terms were non-significant and accounted for little remaining variance. The Estimate coefficients for the regression model are presented in Table 3 .
As indicated in the first step of the regression all three variables uniquely contributed to diagnostic group likelihood. Lower level of attention control was significantly associated with SAD diagnosis, B = -2.14, odds ratio (OR) = 1.18, 95% confidence interval (CI) = .05-.30, Wald = 20.24, p<.001, accounting for 34.6% of the variance in SAD likelihood. Greater negative interpretation bias was also associated with greater probability of SAD diagnosis, B = 3.70, OR 40.26, 95% CI = 2.63-61.7, Wald = 7.05, p<.01, accounting for additional 7.2% of the variance. Finally, greater difficulty to disengage attention from threat was associated with SAD group likelihood, accounting for additional 3.5% of the model's variance, B = .009, OR = 1.01, 95% CI = 1-1.02, Wald = 3.72, p = .05. All of the two-way interactions entered in the second step of the regression were non-significant, ps>.29. Step 1 We also tested this model using the threat engagement index instead of the threat disengagement index. In this model, negative interpretation bias and attention control remained significant predictors of SAD, ps<.01. However, the attentional threat engagement index was not, and the interactions terms were again non-significant, all ps>.10.
Secondary Analysis -Youth Self-Reported Symptom Severity
In a secondary analysis, we tested the contribution of the studied cognitive mechanisms to the level of youths' selfreported social anxiety using a linear regression model. A regression model predicting social anxiety symptoms level (SPAI) across the full sample (SAD and the non-anxious groups) significantly accounted for 47.1% of the variance in self-reported social anxiety symptoms, F(3, 100) = 9.51, p<.001. Only interpretation bias uniquely accounted for variability in symptoms, β = .42, p = .001. Disengagement of attention from angry faces and attention control did not predict social anxiety, p = .95 and p = .08, respectively. The two-way interactions between predictors that were added in the second step of the model did not account for social anxiety level, ps>.24.
However, because this model is based on two extreme groups in relation to the outcome measure of social anxiety, its results might be strongly influenced by these inherent group differences. To examine for possible differentiated cognitive patterns within each group, we also applied the regression analysis within each group separately. For the SAD group, the model predicting social anxiety symptoms level (SPAI) significantly accounted for 45.1% of the variance in self-reported social anxiety symptoms, F(3, 58) = 2.83; p<.001, with similar pattern to the combined model. Only interpretation bias uniquely accounted for variability in symptoms, β = .43, p = .001, while disengagement of attention from angry faces and attention control did not predict social anxiety, p = .43 and p = .32, respectively. All two-way interactions did not significantly account for social anxiety level (all ps>.40) . For the non-anxious group, none of the main or interaction effects were significant, all ps>.05.
Discussion
The current study examined associations among threat-related attention biases, negative interpretation, and attention control in youth with SAD and their non-anxious peers. The results indicate the independent contribution of each of these three factors to SAD. Youth with SAD, relative to non-anxious peers, showed poorer attention control, greater difficulty disengaging attention from threat stimuli, and a tendency to negatively interpret ambiguous social situations. Furthermore, each of these cognitive processes significantly contributed to SAD diagnosis in a multivariate model. Nevertheless, in our data, no interactions manifested between the two cognitive biases or between general attention control and either of the two cognitive biases.
The diagnosis-based regression analysis revealed independent contributions to SAD diagnosis by attentional control, negative interpretation bias, and attentional threat disengagement bias. In contrast, the analysis of self-reported social anxiety symptoms only identified negative interpretation bias as a significant predictor. This difference in results pattern could be due to the differentiated informants on anxiety outcomes (i.e., clinician made diagnosis vs. selfreported anxiety symptoms). The diagnosis was determined by a clinician, based on comprehensive interviews with both child and parent, reviewing SAD as well as other anxiety symptoms. It may be the case that the diagnostic affinity provided by the clinician is more sensitive and therefore captures more anxiety-related differences in cognitive functions relative to children's self-reported anxiety symptoms.
Poorer general attention control in SAD relative to non-anxious youth is consistent with Eysenck's Attention Control Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) . The current results also resonate with other reports of negative associations between attention control and anxiety in children (Muris, de Jong, & Engelen, 2004; Susa, Pitică, Benga, & Miclea, 2012) . Moreover, and relevant to the development of pediatric social anxiety, Cole, Zapp, Fettig, and Pérez-Edgar (2016) recently reported a negative correlation between attention control and social withdrawal in children as young as 4-7 years. This finding emphasize that the direct relation between attention control and social reticence, also found here, is present very early during development, and deserve specific attention in exploring developmental trajectories of SAD.
Recent work on attention and effortful control in relation to anxiety focused on its potential interaction with cognitive biases in predicting anxiety (e.g., Lonigan & Vasey, 2009; Susa et al., 2012) . However, the current results provide no support for this suggestion in youth with SAD. Former reports of such interactive effects refer to attention bias as measured by the probe detection task and are based on community samples of children (e.g., Lonigan & Vasey, 2009) or young adults (Taylor et al., 2016) , whereas here we studied difficulty to disengage from threat (based on a spatial cueing task) in a clinical sample with a specific anxiety disorder. It could be that in youth with SAD specifically, different types of relations, or no relations at all, exist between these cognitive factors in predicting anxiety. Cognitive patterns of clinically anxious youth might be qualitatively different from youth who are within the normative range of social anxiety, representing inflexible information processing biases that are not easily modulated by general attention control. Additional studies are needed in order to replicate, refine, and extend the existing varied results concerning the relation between attention control and cognitive biases in social anxiety.
The lack of interaction between attention and interpretation biases also suggests that among youth, these different cognitive biases may function in SAD as distinct and separate mechanisms. This is consistent with cognitive models that postulate separate and additive contributions of cognitive factors to anxiety, rather than interactional patterns (e.g., Watts & Weems, 2006; Weems & Watts, 2005 ).
In accord with previous studies in adults (e.g., Amir et al., 2003; Buckner et al., 2010; Heeren et al., 2011; Moriya & Tanno, 2011) , difficulty to disengage attention from threat, and not enhanced engagement with threat, differentiated youth with SAD from non-anxious youth. The current study is first to demonstrate this specific threat-related attention pattern in socially anxious youth. This finding could imply that the difficulty to disengage attention from threat in social anxiety starts as early as six years of age and may reflect a stable underlying cognitive characteristic of the disorder. Field and Lester (2010) suggested that according to an integral bias model, a presence of predisposing traits (e.g., negative affect) could produce similar patterns and cognitive biases across the lifespan, with limited interaction between bias and cognitive or social development. Taken together, the current data in youth and the similar findings in adults appear to be in accord with such a model. Patterns of disengagement from threats in the environment has been implicated to hold important factor in the development and maintenance of anxiety (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001) . Considering difficulty to disengage from threat in the context of developmental pathways to anxiety, it has been proposed that such difficulty may serve to maintain anxious responses by increasing rumination on socially threatening cues and prevent capture of alternative cues or contexts (Buckner et al., 2010; Fox et al., 2001) . In contrast, the ability for facilitated disengagement from threat cues may serve as a protective factor from anxiety reactivity by altering threat perception during early stages of evaluation, thereby influencing the cascade of additional negative cognitions and emotional responses (Bar-Haim, Morag, & Glickman, 2011).
The finding concerning interpretation bias also concur with previous studies among socially anxious individuals (e.g., Miers et al., 2008; Muris et al., 2000) . The present study shows that augmented threat interpretations are not only a distinctive cognitive pattern in participants with SAD relative to non-anxious youth, but also reveal that among youth with SAD the more negative threat interpretations are the greater the severity of their social anxiety is.
Some limitations and suggestions for future research may be noted. First, the measures in the current study were taken at a single time point, therefore did not allow examination of within-subject changes or causal links. It might be beneficial if future studies would implement experimental designs to help infer about causality in possible relation between attention and interpretation bias (such as in Bar-Haim et al., 2011; White et al., 2011) . Second, although the measures used in the current study are reliable and acceptable in this field of research, some future adaptations could be considered. First, since relatively low correlations are typically reported between self-reports on attention control ability and performance-based measures of attentional control in youth (e.g., Muris, Mayer, van Lint, & Hofman, 2008) , attention control could be additionally assessed through self-reports (such as the Attention Control Scale, Derryberry & Reed, 2002) , as well as via objective behavioral tasks. In addition, it might be important for future studies to add a more implicit measure of negative interpretation.
In conclusion, the present findings add to the accumulating literature on cognitive biases in pediatric anxiety disorders. In combination with previous results, it suggests that the maladaptive threat processing that differentiates youth with SAD from non-anxious youth, include biased attention and interpretation, as well as poor basic abilities of cognitive control. The present findings indicate a unique and separate influence of each of these factors on SAD, with no indication for the assumed interplay by which these cognitive functions act together to create and preserve social anxiety. Further establishment and elucidation of the specific contributions of specific cognitive biases, as well as more general cognitive disadvantages to the etiology and maintenance of SAD in youth, are essential for the identification of concrete targets for cognitive modification treatments.
